a b s t r a c t
Most current theories of human memory are material-general in the sense that they assume that the medial temporal lobe (MTL) is important for retrieving the details of prior events, regardless of the specific type of materials. Recent studies of amnesia have challenged the material-general assumption by suggesting that the MTL may be necessary for remembering words, but is not involved in remembering faces. We examined recognition memory for faces and words in a group of amnesic patients, which included hypoxic patients and patients with extensive left or right MTL lesions. Recognition confidence judgments were used to plot receiver operating characteristics (ROCs) in order to more fully quantify recognition performance and to estimate the contributions of recollection and familiarity. Consistent with the extant literature, an analysis of overall recognition accuracy showed that the patients were impaired at word memory but had spared face memory. However, the ROC analysis indicated that the patients were generally impaired at high confidence recognition responses for faces and words, and they exhibited significant recollection impairments for both types of materials. Familiarity for faces was preserved in all patients, but extensive left MTL damage impaired familiarity for words. These results show that face recognition may appear to be spared because performance tends to rely heavily on familiarity, a process that is relatively well preserved in amnesia. In addition, the findings challenge material-general theories of memory, and suggest that both material and process are important determinants of memory performance in amnesia.
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What types of processes allow us to recognize events that we have experienced in the past, and how are they instantiated in the brain? Since the time of Aristotle, philosophers and scientists have distinguished between two forms of recognition memory: recollection and familiarity. The former reflects retrieval of qualitative information about a study event upon encountering a previously experienced stimulus, while the latter is a judgment of quantitative strength or fluent processing of an item, without any episodic details coming to mind (see Yonelinas, 2002 for review). In recent years, the field of cognitive neuroscience has made considerable progress in mapping the neural substrates of these two forms of recognition memory. An extensive body of research has indicated that the hippocampus is critical for recollection rather than familiarity, and that regions such as the perirhinal cortex are critical for familiarity (Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Brown & Aggleton, 2001; Bowles et al., 2007; Norman & O'Reilly, 2003; Quamme, Yonelinas, Widaman, Kroll, & Sauve, 2004 While distinguishing between recollection and familiarity, dual process theories of recognition memory are material-general, in the sense that they are expected to characterize the processes that support recognition memory for a wide variety of different materials (Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Atkinson & Juola, 1974; Brown & Aggleton, 2001; Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980; Norman & O'Reilly, 2003; Yonelinas, 1994; see Yonelinas, 2002 for review) . This material-general assumption leads to the prediction that memory is supported by the medial temporal lobes in similar ways for words, faces, scenes, or any other stimulus class. Thus, hippocampal damage should lead to impaired recollection, but spared familiarity, for all classes of items. Conversely, perirhinal cortex damage should impair familiarity but spare recollection, regardless of stimulus class. Finally, extensive medial temporal lobe damage should produce material-general deficits in both recollection and familiarity.
The material-general assumption is not isolated to dual process theories, but is also widely adopted in a host of other memory theories (e.g. Damasio, 1989; Davachi & Wagner, 2002; Eichenbaum, 
